Mind,
Matter, and Metabolism
Peter Godfrey-Smith
CUNY Graduate Center &
University of Sydney
To appear in the Journal of
Philosophy.
This paper is about
the relevance to philosophy of mind of some biological topics – the
nature of life in general, the evolution of animal life in particular. I'll
look especially at a cluster of questions about qualia, consciousness, and the
"explanatory gap." My overall goal is to develop a picture in which
the basis of living activity in physical processes makes sense, the basis of
proto-cognitive and then cognitive processes in living activity makes sense,
and the basis of subjective experience in metabolically situated cognitive
processes also makes sense. I think that working through all the links will
make a difference; things won't look the way they do when we just ask: how can
consciousness exist in a physical system?
Some
steps within this project are made here.[1]
The early sections discuss, drawing on recent biology and biophysics, how
living activity relates to its physical basis, and then the relation between
living activity and cognitive capacities in simple organisms. I try in these
sections to change our picture of the material basis of the mind. Thinking
about life in general only goes so far, though. The next part of the paper is
about the kind of life seen in animals, especially the role of nervous systems
and stages in animal evolution that have particular relevance to the evolution
of subjective experience. I then turn to the possibility of mental states existing
in non-living systems, especially computers. I argue against commonly-held
views about the "multiple realizability" of mental states of the kind
seen in humans. Debates about multiple realizability are often understood in
terms of a question about the importance of "hardware" features of a
system as opposed to its functional organization. However, a rejection of
familiar doctrines of multiple realizability can be developed within
functionalism.
I. Changing views of life and mind
It was once common
to think of life as a sort of bridge between the mental and physical.
Aristotle's view of the different kinds of soul is a position of this kind.
Descartes, in contrast, asserted a mechanistic view of life and isolated the
mental/physical relation as the fundamental problem. Later writers within
materialist and "emergentist" programs revived claims of continuity
between life and mind – these include Spencer, Lewes, Dewey, and
Broad. Most of the classic works developing forms of the "identity
theory" in the 1950s and 1960s tended away from an engagement with this
side of biology, though Herbert Feigl's paper "The 'Mental' and the
'Physical'" (1958) is an important exception which defends a view with
similarities to mine. The "second generation" of identity theories,
those of Armstrong and Lewis, can be seen as moving towards a denial of the
importance of living activity per se.[2]
The landscape was affected in a more profound
manner by the rise of artificial intelligence (AI). This work seemed to show
that some aspects of cognition are mechanizable in principle, and mechanizable
in a non-living system. There seems no question of life being present in a
classical AI system, whether attached to a robot or not, and given that there
seems a real possibility that such a system might realize all of mentality,
there can't apparently be too close a link between life and mind. Computation,
rather than life, became the bridging concept between mental and physical.
Another
development pushing the same way was a change in the understanding of life
itself. There has been a partial deflation of the
concept of life, especially when we compare its roles at earlier stages in the
history of biology. The following interpretation is by no means universally
accepted, but I think the situation looks something like this: we have theories
of the different things that living systems do
– they maintain their organization, using energy and other raw materials,
at least many of them perceive and behave, and they develop, reproduce, and
evolve. Our understanding of those activities is a "theory of life"
of a sort that removes any appearence of a large-scale problem that might
motivate vitalism. But there is no need to say much about which of these
activities, or which combination of them, comprises life. As a result, biology textbooks feel able to say a few general
things in an early chapter about what living systems characteristically do, and
perhaps why these activities tend to cluster, without taking much of a stand on
the nature of life. The textbook will go on to say more definite things about
each of these activities; the books are not relaxed about all biological
concepts, but they are about life.[3]
This development makes it seem even less appealing to use life as a
load-bearing concept in treatments of the mind-body problem. As life has become
less mysterious, it has become less important as a tool.
All
these developments (around computers, and life) are reasonable, but I think
that some of what has resulted is a wrong turn. I'll argue here for the
relevance of some of the biological features associated with life to the
mind-body problem, especially the explanation of subjective experience, the
aspect of the mind-body relation where many believe there is an
"explanatory gap."[4]
My aim is not to put the issue entirely to rest in this paper, but to narrow
the gap and change the framing of the discussion.
Above
I introduced the problem of subjective experience. This is often now identified
with the problem of consciousness.
Some earlier discussions distinguished three main problems in philosophy of
mind: qualia, consciousness, and intentionality. The problem of qualia was seen
as the problem of explaining the first-person feel of the mental, in its
broadest sense, while consciousness was seen as a sophisticated kind of
cognition with a special qualitative side. More recently the problems of
"qualia" and "consciousness" are often grouped together as
one problem, or handled with a distinction between different kinds of consciousness.
If there is something it feels like to be
a system, then the system is said to have a kind of consciousness (perhaps
"phenomenal consciousness").[5]
The
earlier set-up had advantages. The notion of qualia, despite its awkward name, accommodated the possibility that
there might be some sort of very diffuse feeling
present in a system, a minimal form of experience different from anything that
would usually be called "consciousness." To some extent this is a
verbal issue and to some extent it is not. If a person is skeptical about the
idea of feeling, in the broad sense above, existing in an organism that does
not have a complex neural organization similar to our own, then the newer
framework may seem natural. If they think, instead, that simple forms of
feeling probably exist in organisms with nervous systems very different from
ours, and these forms of feeling are the "ground floor" for an
understanding of subjective experience, then a framework that distinguishes the
problems of qualia and consciousness will make more sense. Each terminology can
capture all the possibilities, but each is more naturally suited to a
particular view. Pain is perhaps the best case for motivating a divide between
a broad sense of subjective experience and consciousness. I wonder whether squid
feel pain, whether damage feels like anything to them, but I don't see this as
wondering whether squid are conscious. Consider also the states Derek Denton
calls the "primordial emotions" – bodily feelings which
register important metabolic conditions such as thirst, the need for salt, or
the feeling of not having enough air.[6]
Like Denton, I view these as candidates for being the most basic states that
can feel like something to an organism. Accordingly, I'll use the phrase
"subjective experience" for the broadest category of phenomena here,
also describable by saying that some states of some systems feel like something
to the system itself, and others do not. The problem is explaining the physical
basis of subjective experience in this sense.
II. Matter at the scale of metabolism
I said in the
previous section that life has become
something like a cluster-concept. This cluster has two main parts, or poles.
Life has a metabolic side, and a side that has to do with reproduction and
evolution. Living systems maintain their organization in the face of
thermodynamic tendencies towards disorder and decay, by taking in raw materials
and using sources of energy to control chemical reactions. They also reproduce
and evolve. There's no point in asking whether a system has to do both these
things to be alive, whether either is sufficient, or one is primary. That's a
misguided question. The theoretical connections, instead, are something like
this. Metabolisms are shaped through evolutionary processes. This involves a role
for reproduction as opposed to mere persistence; a metabolic system that can
multiply its instances can evolve in ways that a non-reproducing system cannot,
as the proliferation of any improvement creates many independent platforms on
which further innovation can occur. Among metabolizing systems, then, those
that can reproduce will become more complex and orderly as well as more common.
Reproduction requires control of energy somewhere in the system, though not
always direct control by the reproducer itself. Given this picture, there are
tight evolutionary connections between metabolism and reproduction, but no
impediment to seeing them as different things.
The
metabolic side of life, in a broad sense of that term, is the side that is
important in this paper. (So when I talk of "organisms" below,
viruses and their non-metabolizing relatives are not included.) Let us now look
at what metabolism is like, especially at its physical basis.[7]
Metabolic processes in cells occur at a specific spatial scale, the scale
measured in nanometers – millionths of a millimeter. They also take place
in a particular context, immersed in water. In that context and at that scale,
matter behaves differently from how it behaves elsewhere. In a phrase due to
Peter Hoffman, what we find is a molecular
storm. There is unending spontaneous motion which does not need to be
powered by anything external. Larger molecules rearrange themselves
spontaneously and vibrate, and everything is bombarded by water molecules, with
any larger molecule being hit by a water molecule trillions of times per
second. Electrical charge also plays a ubiquitous role, through ions dissolved
in the water and charged regions of larger molecules. The parts of a cell that do things in the usual sense –
making proteins, for example – are subject to forces much stronger than
the forces they can exert. The way things get done is by biasing tendencies in
the storm, nudging random walks in useful directions, thereby getting a
consistent upshot out of vast numbers of mostly meaningless changes. The
metabolisms of even the simplest known cells are also very complex, with many
hundreds of chemicals involved. Some are more complex than others, but there
are no known simple metabolisms.
Some,
though not all, commentators hold that it is inaccurate to think of the
arrangements within cells as machines.
The chemist Peter Moore, whose article "How to Think About the
Ribosome" (2012) is one of my sources in this section, titles a part of
his paper: "Macromolecular Devices Are Not
Machines." Moore thinks that a machine is a one kind of organized physical
object, in which low-level interactions are predictable and parts are tightly
coupled. A storm-like collection of random walks influenced by friction,
charge, and thermal effects, in contrast, is non-mechanistic. The biophysicist Peter Hoffman, in contrast,
embraces talk of machines in his account of the activities within cells: the
nanoscale is the scale at which "machines run themselves." Hoffman
and Moore do not differ, as far as I can see, in their views of what is going
on within cells; they differ about the actual or useful boundaries of terms
like "machine" and "mechanistic," with Hoffman
understanding these terms in a broader way than Moore.
Metabolism
happens to operate at this special
spatial scale, but does it need to be
that way? Metabolisms are now very complex, I said, but they, too, surely don't
need to be? Surely they once were not
complex, as they evolved from a simple initial form?
Beginning
with the last of these questions, the assumption that life must start from
"simple beginnings" (in Charles Darwin's phrase) is often accepted,
but recent work suggests that this picture is erroneous. My arguments on this
point are based on an interpretation of work surrounded by great deal of
uncertainty, but a picture now emerging may be as follows. It's probably not
true that present-day metabolisms evolved from very simple ones. There probably
never were any metabolisms that were simple in the way that older models of the
origins of life are simple. Those older models assumed that a few crucial
reactions made a first form of life possible. The newer picture holds that the
transition at the origin of life went not from simple to complex, but from
disorderly to orderly.[8]
Disorderly and complex chemical systems gave rise to more orderly complex ones,
featuring regular cycles. A reason to believe this comes from the inevitability
of side-reactions in chemical
systems.[9]
Simple metabolic models use imaginary chemistries in which each part has only
one or two effects. In real chemistry, the parts have many effects of different
sizes. The evolution of life was a matter of channeling and taming this sea of
interactions, not taking a few simple interactions and stringing them together.
Once there are basic metabolisms, they may become more complicated. But, again,
the simplest ones are themselves complicated, and there's a good chance things
have always been that way.
A
second question raised above was as follows: Metabolism happens to operate at the nanoscale in a molecular storm, but does
it need to? How contingent are the
special features of material interaction in living systems? I won't address
this by asking a series of "logically possible? nomically possible?"
questions. Logical possibility is too weak a constraint in this context. Nomic
possibility may be an important issue, but one that is difficult to address
directly, and I will approach it by asking in a more informal way how hard it would be for things to be
different, given the nature of matter and how matter comes to be laid out on
planets.
The physical features of metabolism discussed
above may be very far from accidental. Hoffman argues that the scale and
chemical context seen in actual present-day metabolisms is the only place where
we will find devices of the relevant kind that can work "completely
autonomously." At this level there is spontaneous motion, and the relations between different forms of energy
(chemical, kinetic, electrostatic) are such that a lot can happen through the
transformation of one form of energy into another. At smaller or larger scales,
these complex, partly orderly, and spontaneous processes do not occur. It would
at least be very difficult, then, for life to arise outside this scale and context. Life could not have arisen in
a dry-land macroscopic realm, on the scale of familiar machines. Perhaps once
life exists in a "chemically easy" form, artifactual systems can be
made that have different relations to energy and self-maintenance – I'll
return to issues of this kind later. The message I am trying to emphasize,
though, is that things are more constrained in this area than quick acts of
imagining would suggest.
Some
issues around the "mind-body problem" are about how any sort of mind
could be physically realized. Others are more concerned with our minds, and
their actual physical basis. This paper is intended to motivate claims of both
kinds. First I will make a point about our own case, human minds, using the
material on the table so far. This is a critical point about arguments against
materialism based on conceivability, and the apparent separability of the
mental and physical, as seen in writers such as Nagel, Kripke, and Chalmers.
One kind of argument begins with the fact that it seems that we can conceive of
an exact physical duplicate of an ordinary human, where the duplicate does not
have any subjective experience. It's said that this exercise shows the
separability of mental and physical, and hence the failure of materialism.[10]
The
ideas in this paper are not needed to reject those arguments. An adequate
general reply is that although there is indeed an imaginative act we can engage
in that shows this apparent separability, it can be diagnosed as arising from
idiosyncrasies of the imagination, especially from the separability of what
Nagel (op. cit.) has called
"sympathetic" and "perceptual" imagining. Sympathetic
imagining is imagining being
something; perceptual imagining is imagining seeing it. If materialism was true, it would still seem false,
because of the way our imaginations work: we can imaginatively detach a
sympathetically imagined feeling from any perceptually imagined material basis.[11]
This reply does not make use of ideas about biology like those above. But those
ideas do add something. In us, the material basis for mental activity is tied
to cells and metabolism. When we look at what's actually going on in our bodies
and brains, we find that many of the imaginatively familiar features of the
physical are not present. Many of the features of the physical that strike our
imagination in a way that seems un-mental
are not present. And it is difficult to imagine the crucial processes at
all, hard to get any sort of intuitive handle on what they are capable of.
Arguments against materialism based on conceivability rely on the
trustworthiness of intuitions about what the particular physical processes
inside us can produce. Once we see what those physical processes are actually
like, the trustworthiness of the crucial intuitions is much reduced.
This point can be brought into contact also with an earlier
argument against materialism, Leibniz's "mill" argument. Leibniz says it is impossible in principle to give an explanation for
"perception" and other mental states in terms of mechanical
processes. We can see this by considering a thought-experiment:[12]
[W]e must confess that
perception, and what depends upon it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical
reasons, that is through shapes, size, and motions. If we imagine a machine
whose structure makes it think, sense, and have perceptions, we could conceive
it enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we could enter into it, as
one enters a mill. Assuming that, when inspecting its interior, we will find
only parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a
perception. And so, one should seek perception in the simple substance and not
in the composite or in the machine.
LeibnizÕs mill was a macro-scale object, and the causal relations
he describes are characteristic of that scale. An aqueous nano-mill would be a
very different place. If we were
observers of a living system at an intracellular scale, we would see some
"parts that push one another," but not in the manner of
macroscopic machines, and we would not only see pushes. We would see a storm of
activity biased by charge and
shape, generating partially random walks that, on average, tend in orderly
directions. The processes are more causally holistic, noisier – more a
matter of "herding molecular cats" – than a push-pull model
allows.
Explaining
how the whole process amounts to human "perception," as Leibniz
asked, still requires working at a different level of description from the
intracellular, but what seemed to be an obvious antipathy between mental and physical
is much reduced. Our immediate intuitive response to the scene would surely
tend towards panpsychism, if anything. That would be another over-reaching; we
would not be learning something about matter in general from seeing how a
living system works. And regardless of where our intuitions might be led,
macroscopic machines provide a poor model for the material basis of living
activity, and for the material basis of mental activity in living beings like
us.
III. Life and cognition
I now turn to another
side of the "bridging" role that biology may play in this area. This
involves the link between living activity (in the metabolic sense) and the
mind.
Starting
with some obvious facts: all the systems we know of that are clear and
uncontested cases of systems with minds are also living systems. The same is
true of nearly all the usual contested candidates for having a mind –
simple animals. The exceptions to this generalization about contested cases are
sophisticated AI systems. A converse principle is also true: all known
(metabolically) living systems engage in some cognitive or proto-cognitive
processes. The term "proto-cognitive" will be discussed further
below, but the activities I see as proto-cognitive include (at least) sensing
events and responding to them in a way that helps keep the system alive.
Before
discussing generalizations about life and cognition further, I'll look at
proto-cognitive capacities in bacteria. Bacteria (and archaea, which are
superficially similar but distant in evolutionary terms) are the simplest known
organisms with metabolisms. They
do a considerable amount of sensing and responding to events around them. I'll
divide what they do into two main categories, one that involves gene regulation
and another that contains everything else.
First,
many of the control processes seen in bacteria work through the genome, by the
regulation of gene expression. The output of these systems is chemical, rather
than "behavioral" in the usual sense. Genetic systems in all
organisms work through processes with a quite strongly computational character,
featuring cascades of interactions that can be described in terms of ands, ors and nots. This may
look like an immediate help to my case, but that is not so straightforward. A
person might say that computation is
the crucial concept here, and computation is seen both inside and outside
living systems. Computation is important in gene action and important for
thinking, but those are separate matters and computation does not have any
essential connection to life in general. That would be a reasonable response to
what's on the table so far, and I think it shows that describing the biological
role of computation, in an ordinary sense of that term, is not enough. But what
we see in basic kinds of metabolic life is something more specific than
computation in that sense, and also something more specific than mere
sensitivity to external stimuli. It is the use of sensing and responding, often
coordinated with boolean or boole-approximating operations, to maintain the
integrity of a system and its activity, seeking and maintaining some states
while avoiding others. A collection of ands
and if-thens with no metabolic point
to them would be a different sort of thing. When the genome is used to
adaptively control the synthesis of metabolically important chemicals by
tracking conditions in the external environment, that is proto-cognitive in the sense I have in mind.
The
second category consists of proto-cognitive control by means of devices that
are not immediately dependent on the genome for their operation (though they do
depend on it for their construction). A good example is chemotaxis (movement
towards or away from chemicals) in the bacterium E. coli. This system makes use of memory; swimming choices at each
time-step are controlled by a comparison made between the levels of good or bad
chemicals that are presently sensed and the levels sensed a few seconds before.
If conditions are improving, the cell swims straight. If they are getting
worse, the cell takes random "tumbles."[13]
As
with the genome-based mechanisms discussed above, an activity like this is
proto-cognitive in a sense that does not merely involve a relation to
computation. Simple organisms sense and respond to events, both internal and
external, in a way that implements a distinction between states and outcomes
that are sought and maintained and other states and outcomes that are avoided.
Boundaries between the system and its environment are controlled. With
proto-cognition in this sense comes a kind of minimal subjectivity. Simple organisms have a "point of view" in
a richer sense than, say, a digital camera, which also senses and computes, but
does not control its boundaries and maintain a metabolism.
Is
proto-cognition of this kind always
present in cells? Even if it is always present now, does it need to be? Perhaps
proto-cognitive activity is a good idea for any (metabolically) living thing,
and hence it readily evolves, even though it has no necessary connection to the
metabolic side of life. If a metabolically active system had an easy enough
environment, might it get away with none
of this, at least until smarter competitors evolve? How lacking in
proto-cognition could a viable living system be? Locomotion, for example, is
optional for bacteria, not essential, though the majority of bacteria
apparently do it.
If
we look at reasonable candidates for the simplest organisms known, the bacteria
called Mycoplasma, we find that they
do engage in adjustment of metabolism to external events. One of the findings
taken to be quite striking when these organisms were recently studied was the
dynamic nature of their gene regulation. Mycoplasma are not ideal examples
because they went backwards with respect to complexity from ancestors with
larger genomes. They are not remnants of old forms, but cases of reduction due
to a parasitic lifestyle.[14]
More generally, as far as I know, the genomes of all bacteria sequenced thus
far (including Mycoplasma) include at least some genes for "signal
transduction" systems, which regulate cell metabolism by reacting to
external circumstances.[15]
Perhaps
there are actual-world cases which approximate being metabolisms with no
proto-cognitive adjustment of activity to conditions. It would take a lot to show that there never were any organisms like this
– to show that the only ways to maintain a viable metabolism include
processes that can, on independent grounds, be considered proto-cognitive. What
is known, at least, is that proto-cognition is widespread in bacteria and
present also in archaea. The bacteria/archaea split is the oldest known
evolutionary split between kinds of life on earth, dating from something like
3.5 billion years ago (though archaea, which have been studied less, appear to
have fewer signal transduction systems than bacteria).[16]
So
at present there is both theoretical and empirical uncertainty about how
closely proto-cognitive activities and metabolism are connected. By
"theoretical" uncertainty, I refer to uncertainty about where the
boundaries of the proto-cognitive lie. This boundary will not be sharp, and
non-competing broader and narrower concepts will probably be defensible, but a
better specification than the one I've been using here ought to be possible. It
is probably a mistake to restrict proto-cognition to capacities that implement
a flow from sensors to effectors, especially if sensing itself is restricted to
"exterosensing" or tracking external conditions. I have emphasized
those capacities here because they present a clear case, and the easiest to use
when arguing for the role of proto-cognitive activities in prokaryotes. The
concept of proto-cognition should probably be broadened, however, to include at
least some activities that achieve purely internal coordination – the
spatial or temporal coordination of actions across parts of a system, as
opposed to coordinating actions with external conditions.[17]
Aside from this theoretical uncertainty, we also need to know the lower limits
on proto-cognitive control in real metabolisms. One view that might be defended
is that proto-cognitive abilities are distinct from metabolic life, but are a
natural and expected addition, something living systems quickly gain. Another
possibility is that the two are more inextricably tied together. Closer ties might
be present in some particular kinds of life. In multicellular organisms, a
great deal of signaling between cells goes into the making of the body itself
and keeping that body running. "Cell-to-cell signaling" is not merely
a matter of one cell affecting another; it involves interaction between
specialized producers and receptors of evolved signal molecules.
Even
if proto-cognition and metabolism are extricable in principle, they are tightly
connected in organisms like us. The line between the "information
processing" side of human brain activity and the metabolic side is porous. One example from many that could be given from
recent neuroscience concerns the role of the diffusion of small molecules, like nitric oxide,
through the brain. These molecules, which affect plasticity at synapses and the
distribution of receptors for neurotransmitters, move not only between neurons,
but are released and taken up by blood vessels and glial cells as well.[18] In addition, in living systems the active structures change continually just from
being used – they reflect their immediate history and are weakly
affected by what many other parts are doing. When the same neuron is exposed
repeatedly to the same stimulus, it does not simply reproduce the same pattern
of firing, but behaves differently each time. This sensitivity to history is
not mere "noise," but raw material on which adaptive plasticity can
be built.[19]
IV. Animal life
The earlier
sections of this paper outlined a view of material basis of life, and the
relation between life and the beginnings of cognition and subjectivity. Some
progress on the mind-body problem can be made through this general reshaping of
the terrain, but it can only take us so far. The points about life made above
apply as much to bacteria and plants, which are usually seen as lacking all
subjective experience, as to animals like us. How far these general points take us depends on questions about
continuities and discontinuities. One option at this stage is a radical view,
albeit one that can be introduced in an innocuous way by combining the
biological facts above with a simple form of functionalism. This form of
functionalism holds that the "mental" has a qualitative side and a
cognitive side, and they are closely tied together; the qualitative is just
what the cognitive feels like from the inside. Cognition exists in simpler and
more complex forms, and we saw that minimal forms are present in unicellular
organisms. Perhaps, then, we should embrace a gradient with respect to both the
cognitive and qualitative. Some form of subjective experience will then be
present in all living things.
This view can be called biopsychism. (The term was introduced by Ernst Haeckel in 1892,
with a meaning close to what I have above.)[20]
Biopsychism is one of a family of radical options, other members of which have
seen extensive recent discussion. Classical panpsychism,
which holds that all matter has a mental character, has been explicitly
defended by Strawson, Goff, and others, and sympathetically discussed by Nagel
and Chalmers.[21] A variant on
panpsychism has also been developed by the neuroscientist Guilio Tononi, based
on a measure of "informational integration." This view holds that all
systems containing interactions that can be described in terms of information
flow have some amount of consciousness, provided that there is some degree of
"integration" of this information, a criterion met by simple
non-living switching devices, smartphones, and the like. According to
biopsychism, the low end of the mental scale is inhabited not by unorganized
matter (panpsychism), or simple machines (Tononi), but the simplest forms of
life.
A
problem with the assessment of all the radically "generous" views in
this area is the difficulty of thinking about the difference between a complete
absence of subjective experience and a minimal but nonzero scrap of it.
Biopsychism has advantages over other members of its family, though. The
argument for biopsychism derives, as I said, from an ordinary form of
functionalism about the mental plus empirical facts about living systems.
Subjectivity has more plausible minimal forms in living activity than in matter per se, or in sheer causal complexity
of any kind. While the identification of prokaryotes as minimal experiencing
subjects is startling, rocks, thermostats, and phones are not in the picture.
Biopsychism
in something like the present sense has been endorsed by a number of writers
– by Herbert Jennings round 1900, more recently by Maxine
Sheets-Johnstone and Lynn Margulis (though Haeckel himself, in his 1892 paper,
endorsed panpsychism).[22]
If functionalism about the mind together with the empirical facts motivate a
biopsychist view, what is to tell against it other than sheer weirdness? It is
hard for us to think about the low end of the scale with respect to the
qualitative side, because "thinking about" it includes imagining what
it would feel like to be such a system, and here our sympathetic imagination
founders. But that's not the fault of biopsychism.
I
don't dismiss biopsychism entirely, but the rest of this paper will work within
a less radical response to the ideas introduced in earlier sections. Metabolic
activity gives rise to a certain kind of unit – a biological self, or a subject in minimal sense. Being a subject of this kind is not
sufficient for subjective experience,
however. That only exists when the organism engages in sensing and action of a
richer kind. In organisms like us, a to-and-fro involving the senses and action
comprises much of the pattern of subjective experience. We have learned that
this pattern in us has evolutionary origins in simpler forms, and is seen today
in unicellular forms of life. That can be asserted without saying that
subjective experience itself extends to all living things.
If
this is true, what are the crucial stages and transitions that took organisms
to subjective experience? Some such transitions took place before the evolution
of animals and nervous systems. The evolution of the eukaryotic cell from
physically simpler cells included changes in sensory and behavioral capacities
even before these cells gathered into multicellular organisms. Though a fuller treatment would include this and related
steps, I focus here on the evolution of animals.[23]
The evolution of animals was one of several independent
transitions to multicellular life, occurring perhaps 800-900 million years ago.
Multicellularity creates a new kind of metabolic unit, hence a new kind of
subject, and it makes possible the differentiation and specialization of parts
with respect to the proto-cognitive capacities that had been crammed previously
into single cells. Some of this is possible without a nervous system. Sponges
and placozoa display some simple behaviors despite lacking a nervous system,
and recent work has shown surprising proto-cognitive capacities in plants.[24]
But the elaboration of these capacities was greatly affected by the evolution
of the nervous system.
Nervous
systems probably arose quite quickly in the animal branch of the tree of life
– perhaps 700 million years ago. For many people, this is the landmark that puts mentality on the
table, at least as a possibility. Philosophers of mind often operate with a
picture in which living activity is a kind of non-mental substrate, and then
evolution lays a computer – the nervous system – on top of the
merely living, after which cognition and subjective experience result.
Though
this view may contain some truth, it is not straightforwardly aligned with the
biology. First, the question of what a nervous system is does not have a straightforward answer, and the difficulties are
relevant here. A nervous system is at least a means by which cells affect each
others' electrical properties, by chemical signaling or direct contact. This
kind of activity is found in plants and "non-neural" sponges, though.
A narrower conception, perhaps one tacitly assumed in much biology, treats neuron as a partially morphological, as
well as functional, category. A neuron in this sense is an electrically
excitable cell that influences another cell by means of electrical or secretory
mechanisms, and whose morphology
includes specialized projections.[25]
Neurons in this sense are not seen outside animals. A nervous system, then, is
an interacting collection of cells that are (or include) neurons in this sense.
What
nervous systems do is achieve specific kinds
of cell-cell interaction – interactions that are fast, targeted, and
directional. The projections on a neuron enable that cell to affect the
electrical properties of another cell some distance from it, without affecting
all those along the way. The contrast between neural and non-neural organisms
is not one between organisms with networks of cells that affect each others'
electrical properties and organisms that do not. The contrast involves alternative
modes of cell-to-cell interaction, especially a distinction between fast,
targeted, and directional influence as opposed to more diffuse patterns of
influence that result from a release and uptake of chemicals not organized with
projections and synapses. The general character of the influence that one
neuron has on another is something also seen outside neural organisms, but the
speed and targeting of this influence are special.
The
earliest animal fossils, those of the Ediacaran period, 635-540 million years
ago, are the remains of soft-bodied sea creatures that appear to have had very
simple behavioral capacities. Genetic evidence makes it likely that nervous
systems had evolved by this time, and some of the basic animal groups had begun
to diversify. But if the fossilized bodies
are a guide, there is little indication of complex sensorimotor capacities; Ediacaran animals had no legs, claws, or antennae, and
there are no signs of complicated eyes. Many of these animals seem to have
lived on the sea floor, grazing on microbes or filter-feeding, and there is
little or no evidence of predation.[26]
Nervous systems at this time may have had functions quite different from those
we usually associate with them now; they may have functioned largely in the internal
coordination of the first animal actions, and also in the coordination and
timing of physiological and developmental events such as metamorphosis. Rather
than the sensorimotor control that contemporary philosophy of mind
emphasizes, their role may have been largely one of pulling the animal together.
The
Cambrian period, beginning around 540 million years ago, sees a rapid diversification of
animals, and also new kinds of bodies – bodies with legs and claws, along
with sophisticated eyes of several kinds. From the Cambrian onwards, animal
evolution features behavioral regimes that are recognizably "modern,"
with extensive interaction between individuals, including predation. The
initiators and drivers of this change are controversial, but a range of views
hold that one important feature of Cambrian evolution was a process of feedback
that linked the evolution of bodies with the evolution of new kinds of
behavioral interaction. The evolution of image-forming eyes may have been
particularly important, a trigger for other changes. Whether eyes were pivotal
or not, the role for nervous systems that we are familiar with – the
fine-grained linking of perception and action – seems to have become more
prominent.
The
most behaviorally sophisticated animals of this time were arthropods such as
trilobites, and simple fish. Did such animals have subjective experience? This
question is hard to address for a host of reasons – factual
uncertainties about their nervous systems and lives, as well as the
philosophical difficulties. But I suggest that at least from this point, the
positions organized around gradients, sketched earlier in this section, are
well-motivated. From this point onwards the evolving differences between animals
have a mostly quantitative character: some animals have more neurons, more sophisticated learning and categorization, more
complex behavior. These changes occurred along several independently evolving
lines – especially in some vertebrates, some arthropods (eg., bees,
spiders, crabs), and a few molluscs (cephalopods).
Perhaps
my focus on the behavioral complexity of the Cambrian is an error; perhaps it
is a prejudice to associate subjective experience only with that kind of
nervous system and activity. Perhaps more windowless and self-absorbed lives
are equally plausible bases for subjective experience. But at least from this period onwards there seems good reason to work
within a gradient-structured view of subjective experience and its evolution.
To
conclude this section I will look at an objection to the ideas just above. That
discussion envisaged a fairly simple relationship between the cognitive and
qualitative sides of the mind. An important theme of recent neurobiological
work, though, sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, is a rejection of any
simple mapping between the richness of the cognitive and qualitative. Much of
the cognitive processing going on in ordinary humans has no subjective feel at
all. The subset that we do experience appears to involve the exercise of a
specific set of skills, a style of
processing that is probably not found in various other animals that can
nonetheless perceive and navigate the world. When those capacities evolved, it
might be argued, so did subjective experience, and not before; vague talk
of "gradients" does not take seriously what we have been learning.
Subjective experience, on this view, is probably an evolutionary latecomer, and rare among animals.
One
basis for this argument is work showing the absence of subjective experience
not only in "early" stages of perceptual processing of various kinds,
but in perceptual states with quite direct roles in the control of behavior.[27]
The "dual stream" model of vision developed by David Milner and
Melvyn Goodale posits two paths by which visual information is processed in the
mammalian brain, of which only one, the "ventral stream," leads to
experiences felt as vision. Ventral
stream vision functions in the recognition of objects. The dorsal stream
handles basic navigation and tasks such as reaching, and does so in a way that
can produce effects akin to "blindsight," where a person denies being
able to see but can act effectively on some visual information. Milner and
Goodale distinguish basic sensorimotor abilities from actions based on the
construction of an "internal model" of the world, and they associate
visual experience only with the latter. "Global workspace" models of
consciousness developed by Bernard Baars, Stanislas Dehaene and others, along
with views of consciousness based on sophisticated forms of memory and
attention, also appear to motivate a latecomer view, as they all associate
consciousness with capacities that go well beyond the mere ability to sense,
act, and remember.[28]
In
response to this argument, I agree that recent data casts doubt on any simple
mapping between the cognitive and qualitative. A latecomer view is one response
to these findings. There's also another, though, which I will call the transformation view. According to this
view, some late-evolving features of our brains do greatly affect the nature of subjective experience, but they don't bring it
into being. They modify more basic kinds of experience that were already
present, and this may include pushing some things into the background, so far
back as to make them hard to report on and remember. Basic forms of subjective
experience were present earlier and require less neurological complexity, and
these kinds of experience were then evolutionarily transformed. The distinction
between subjective experience and consciousness, discussed earlier in this
paper, is important in this context. Much human experience does involve the
integration of different senses, integration of the senses with memory, and so
on, but there's also an ongoing role for what seem to be old forms of experience
that appear as intrusions into more organized kinds of processing. Consider the
intrusion of sudden pain, or of the "primordial emotions" in Derek
Denton's sense. Those are forms of subjective experience with an obvious
biological rationale, but not apparently reliant on centralization and internal
model-building. They may be older and more widely distributed among animals.
V. Functionalism, multiple realization, and AI
How do the ideas in
this paper bear on the functionalist doctrine of the multiple realizability of
mental states, and the prospects for "strong AI"?
A
package of views popular since at least the 1970s runs as follows. Human minds
have a particular biochemical basis, but this is a contingent feature, not a
necessary one. A physical system has mental states in virtue of its abstract
causal organization, in virtue of how its states are connected to sensory
input, behavioral output, and each other. In us, the causal roles
characteristic of the mental have particular physical realizers, and those physical realizers are brain states with a
chemistry of proteins, lipids, nucleic acids, and so on. But other realizers
could, in principle, play the same roles. This means that a computer with a
very different chemistry could have physical states which realize the causal
roles characteristic of a human mental life, if suitably programmed and
(perhaps) if connected to a robot of the right kind. Artificial intelligence is
possible in this strong sense ("strong AI"). Further, any system that
has the same functional and hence cognitive profile as a human agent must have
the same subjective experiences.[29]
I
think this package is probably wrong in several respects. In particular, there
is no reason to believe that a system with the physical make-up envisaged in
strong AI scenarios could have the kind of subjective experience present in a
human agent. The strongest claim that might be made here is that AI systems of
the kind usually envisaged in the literature would have no subjective
experience at all. My argument here will be less ambitious; I'll argue that
there is no reason to think they could have subjective experience of a kind
relevantly similar to ours.
When
the ideas about AI and multiple realization laid out above are questioned, it
is usually thought that the choice to make is one between the view that a set
of organizational features suffices for mentality, and the view that these
organizational features plus a
particular make-up are needed. Once the choice is put that way, it is natural
to wonder how the material details could make much difference. But that posing
of the question is not applicable to the view defended in this paper. My claim
is not that nonbiological materials that do
all the same things might not count because of their physical nature. Rather,
the usual candidates offered as a nonbiological basis for mentality will not do the same things. They will be
functionally different, not merely different in "hardware" or
"make-up." The view defended here can be expressed as a kind of
functionalism. "Functional" properties in the sense relevant to
philosophy of mind are grain-specific. Any system has coarser and finer grained
functional features. Long-standing habits in discussion of functionalism have
accustomed people to the idea that rather coarse-grained functional profiles
are the ones that are most relevant. Against that background, arguments about
the importance of the metabolic can be expressed by saying that a set of
fine-grained functional properties of living systems matter more than is
usually supposed.[30]
Suppose,
then, that we have a living and a robotic system that can both be described in
terms of the same coarse-grained set of cognitive categories: perception,
learning, decision-making. Any system that perceives, learns, or decides will
do so in a particular fine-grained way – fine-grained with respect to
behavior and also with respect to internal processes. Those details, it is
often thought, are irrelevant to its status as
a perceiver or decider. As a result, the artificial system can genuinely
perceive, or genuinely learn, despite doing so in a way that differs from a
human perceiver or learner in fine-grained ways. So far, I agree. There are
reasonable coarse-grained senses of "learn" and "perceive"
in which anything with the right coarse-grained functional profile, including a
robot, does learn and perceive.
Subjective
experience itself has coarse and fine-grained features; there is being in pain,
and being in a particular kind of pain. A commonly held view is that an
artificial system might, in principle, be a genuine duplicate of a human with
respect to its functional profile, and hence must also have the same subjective
experience. And setting aside duplicates, two systems with similar functional
profiles should have similar subjective experience. We can then be more and
more confident that an artificial system has similar qualitative states to a
human as the functional profile of the artificial system approximates the human
one more and more closely.
However,
it may be false that any system with
the material properties usually envisaged for the AI system – a
device made of metal, silicon, and other standard computer materials
– could be close enough to the functional profile of a human for
this similarity-based argument to show something about the subjective
experience of the AI system. Part of the message of earlier sections of this
paper is the enormous functional difference between a living system and this AI
system, despite any coarse-grained cognitive similarity. This difference can be
hard to keep in focus because the AI system, imagined or real, has been
designed as a non-living analogue of a living system. It's only a partial
analogue, though; it has a combination of no metabolism but a lot of
information-processing. In the living system, the information-processing side
of its activity is integrated with the metabolic side, so the two can only
share coarse-grained functional properties.[31]
One
way to criticize defences of strong AI is to say that the AI system's
"cognitive" or "information processing" features are fake;
it merely simulates those things, rather than realizing them. John Searle has
defended this view for many years.[32]
That is not the view I am defending here. The AI system's processing is not
fake, but it's different. As noted earlier, concepts such as sensing and computation have broad meanings that are not specific to processes
embedded in a metabolism. The same is true of other cognitive notions such as memory, inference, and so on. An artificial system lacking a metabolism can
be a genuine realizer of those capacities, and hence might share some of the
coarse-grained cognitive features seen in a living system. This coarse-grained
cognitive profile is part of what a
living system has, but it also has fine-grained functional properties – a
host of micro-computational activities in each cell, signal-like interactions
between cells, self-maintenance and control of boundaries, and so on. Those
finer-grained features are not merely ways of realizing the cognitive profile
of the system. They matter in ways that can independently be identified as
cognitively important. An example that can be reprised from section III is
plasticity. Living systems change their input-output profile as a result of
their own activity. The system changes what it does, in non-trivial ways, just
as a result of doing it. Causal processes in biological systems are based in
networks with many redundancies and small effects. These have consequences for
robustness and adaptability. Computers,
in contrast, have different reliability properties, and have them for good
economic reasons. They are engineered not
to change continually in slight ways from their mere operation, except when
this changeability is programmed in. Some low-level physical changes will be inevitable, but these are
engineered to be as small as possible. Computers are different from living
systems in ways that make engineering sense (on one side) and biological sense
(on the other).
The
points in this section can be made in an especially focused way by looking at
an argument offered by Chalmers for the multiple realizability (or
"organizational invariance") of the mental, including subjective
experience. This is his "dancing qualia" argument.[33]
Imagine an ordinary human agent for whom a backup control device is built out
of ordinary computer hardware. The second control device is connected by radio
transmitters to the body's sensors and effectors, so that when activated it can
control behavior in the usual way. It is assumed that the backup system
realizes exactly the same functional profile as the subject's brain, so that
the subject's behavior is unaffected. Imagine now a rapid switching between
"natural" or brain-based control of behavior and control by the backup
system. If the character of subjective experience depends on the material
make-up as well as the functional properties of a system, does their experience
jump between different forms as the switching is done, or perhaps flip in and
out of existence entirely, despite the agent's behavior continuing
uninterrupted? These suggestions, Chalmers thinks, lead to extremely
implausible consequences, and we should instead conclude that "by far the most plausible hypothesis is that
replacement of neurons while preserving functional organization
will preserve qualia, and that experience is wholly determined by functional organization."[34]
The
partly artificial system used in this thought-experiment – human body
plus silicon-based controller – is called by Chalmers a "fine-grained functional duplicate" of
the original human. Given the nature of grain differences, though, functional
similarity is a matter of degree. Chalmers also says that he will "always
focus on a level of organization fine enough to determine the behavioral capacities
and dispositions of a cognitive system." But behavioral dispositions are
themselves grain-dependent. Two systems with the same behavioral dispositions
at a coarse grain can differ with respect to timing, with respect to variation
across their production of the "same" behavior on different
occasions, and in many other ways. Given the differences between biological and
artificial control devices discussed earlier in this paper, it is not possible
for a biological controller and an artificial back-up to give rise to identical
patterns of behavior, even if they can give rise to similar ones.
Without the strong assumptions of
behavioral equivalence, Chalmers's thought-experiments do not have the consequences he supposes. In a "dancing qualia" case, even if much is conceded to
Chalmers in the set-up, it will not be possible to switch seamlessly between
two controllers without sudden cognitive and behavioral changes at some level
of grain. Consider also the related scenario, discussed by many, that Chalmers
calls "fading qualia." Here we assume gradual cell-by-cell
replacement of neurons by silicon-based controllers. Chalmers imagines that as
the replacement is done, the agent retains the same behavioral dispositions, so
it is strange to suppose that they might lose their qualia. I reply that as the
replacement is done, not only do their insides work more and more differently,
they must behave more and more differently as well. The new agent is a quite
different system. Nothing compels us to believe they have the kind of
experience characteristic of human life.
I
want to make clear the role of these points about behavioral divergence. I am
not conceding that any system with the same behavior as a human must have the
same mental states, and then noting that an AI system will not have the same
behavior. Nearly all views in this area imply that behavioral equivalence is
not sufficient for equivalence in mental states. The neural replacement
arguments of Chalmers and others are not merely intended to put pressure on
those who think behavioral properties are not enough; they are intended to show
something more deeply problematic in the view that the biological basis of
cognition matters for subjective experience. They are intended to be cases in
which not only all the behaviors produced, but all the cognitive features
underlying those behaviors, are held constant. Could subjective experience vary
with all that held fixed? In response, I say that if one replaces a living
system with a nonliving one, those things are not held fixed. The assumption of
behavioral equivalence is supposed to make the switch between a biological and
a non-biological controller appear insignificant. But this difference is
significant, with respect to both internal activity and the behavior that
results. The behavioral differences are not themselves the features responsible
for a difference in subjective experience, but consequences of the mass of
internal features that do make the difference.
Setting aside arguments about the
"duplication" of human functional profiles in artificial systems,
what becomes of the possibility of very different physical bases for mental
states? The argument made here is not that the particular chemical elements and
molecules must matter. They might be hard to replace in some cases, easier in
others. But the functional profile that would have to be realized includes
living activity. If this can be realized artificially, it would be achieved on
a different path from that pursued in familiar AI and robotics projects.
VI. Conclusion
One contributor to
the bridging of the "explanatory gap" is a critical rethinking of
intuitions that lie behind the standard ways of approaching the problem. Other
contributions will come from new pieces of theory. In working towards the first
of these, I criticized the intuitions seen in arguments against materialism in
general (section II) and against the family of materialist views that make use
of a biological framework (section V). On the positive side, I laid out a set
of biological resources relevant to the problem, and outlined one approach
using these resources while noting other options along the way. The approach I
took was to emphasize the biological basis of subjectivity. Other possible
avenues include views that assert stronger ties between metabolic activity and
cognition itself, and radical options such as biopsychism.
Further
questions arise immediately along the path taken in this paper. What is the
significance of the collective nature
of animals – the fact that animals are multicellular entities –
given that cells in a free-living state are themselves minimal subjects and
multicellularity depends on signaling? Second, the ideas developed in section
IV about the origins of experience in animal evolution depend on unresolved questions
about the nature of the knit between the cognitive and qualitative. And while
section VI rejected some familiar views about multiple realizability, once the
role of the metabolic has been embraced, many questions remain about how
closely the mind is tied to the biochemical features of life on earth.
* * *
* This paper is based on a talk
given at the NYU "Modern Philosophy" Conference, 2014. I am grateful
to those present for helpful comments. Many parts of this paper have been influenced
by discussions with Rosa Cao.
[1] Other parts of the
view are developed in a companion paper, "Animal Evolution and the Origins of
Experience," to
appear in David Livingstone Smith (ed.), How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New
Foundations for Naturalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press). Ideas in Evan Thompson's Mind
in Life (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010) overlap with and have influenced
the present paper.
[2] For the initial
shift, see Aristotle's De Anima and
RenŽ Descartes's Discourse on the Method
of Rightly
Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences (1637). For biologically oriented discussions of materialism, see
Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology
(London: Longman, Brown and Green, 1955); George Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind
(London: Kegan Paul, 1875); John Dewey, Experience and Nature (La Salle:
Open Court, 1925); C. D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1925). For the "identity
theory," see Ullin T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?"
British Journal of Psychology XLVII (February 1956): 44–50;
Herbert Feigl "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical.'" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Volume 2: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, edited by Herbert Feigl, Michael
Scriven, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958);
J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations
and Brain Processes," Philosophical Review 68 (April 1959):
141–156; David Lewis, "An Argument for the Identity Theory," this JOURNAL LXIII (January 1966): 17–25; David Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).
[3] For a dissenting
view, see Marc Bedau, "What Is Life?" In Sahotra Sarkar and Anya Plutynski, (eds.), A
Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. (New York: Blackwell,
2008). For a deflationary view of life similar to the one defended here, see
Philip Kitcher, "Things Fall Apart," The Stone (New York Times
Opinionator), September 8, 2013,
URL=http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/things-fall-apart/?_r=0.
[4] See Joseph Levine,
"Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly LXIV (October 1983): 354-361.
[5] For treatments
employing this broad sense of "consciousness," see Thomas Nagel,
"What is it Like to be a Bat?" Philosophical
Review LXXXIII
(October 1974): 435-450; David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Ned Block,
"Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness." In Michael Gazzaniga
(ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences IV
(2009): 1111-1123.
[6] See Derek Denton, Michael McKinley, Michael Farrell, and Gary Egan, "The Role of Primordial Emotions in the Evolutionary Origin of
Consciousness," Consciousness and Cognition XVIII (June 2009):
500–514.
[7] In this part of the paper I draw on on Peter Hoffman's book Life's Ratchet: How Molecular Machines Extract
Order from Chaos (New York: Basic Books, 2012) and Peter Moore's "How Should
we Think About the Ribosome?" Annual
Review of Biophysics 41
(2012): 1–19.
I have also benefitted here from discussion with Derek Skillings; see his
"Mechanistic Explanation of Biological Processes" (Philosophy of Science, forthcoming).
Special features of causal relations present at the nanoscale in biology are
discussed also in Marco
Nathan, "Causation by Concentration," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science LXV
(2) (2012): 191-212.
[8] For simpler models
see Tibor G‡nti, The Principles of Life
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Freeman Dyson The Origins of Life, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999). Dyson did call his a "toy model," and his main aim was
to reassert the importance of metabolism as opposed to replication. He might
accept the view outlined here.
[9] See Leslie Orgel,
"The Implausibility of Metabolic Cycles on the Prebiotic Earth," PLoS Biology VI(1): e18 (2008) and Ešrs Sz‡thmary, "The Evolution of
Replicators," Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B CCCLV (November 2000): 1669-76.
[10] See Nagel,
"Armstrong on the Mind," Philosophical Review LXXIX (July 1970): 394–403; Saul
Kripke, Naming and Necessity
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Chalmers op. cit.
[11] Think of the
situation in Bayesian terms: the evidence (in imagination) is equally likely
given the truth and the falsity of materialism, so the prior probabilities,
whatever they were, remain unchanged.
[12] Gottfried W. Leibniz, Monadology section 17 (1714/1898, translated
by Robert Latta, Oxford: Oxford University Press).
[13] For E. Coli chemotaxis, see Melinda Baker,
Peter Wolanin, and Jeffrey Stock, "Signal Transduction in Bacterial Chemotaxis," Bioessays XXVIII (January 2006):
9–22.
[14] For genetic control
processes in Mycoplasma, see Marc
GŸell and 15 other authors, "Transcriptome Complexity in
a Genome-Reduced Bacterium," Science
CCCXXVI (November 2009):
1268-1271.
[15] The smallest known
number is one. Carsonella is
technically a bacterium, but lives in a confined symbiosis inside specialized
cells in sap-sucking insects. It has a vastly reduced genome of 182 genes (with
many overlapping), but including one for signal transduction. It is so far from
being capable of free-living existence that it is probably better regarded as
an organelle – a specialized part of the containing animal cell. Carsonella lacks genes for the
manufacture of membranes, for example, and for control of cell division (see Javier
Tamames, Rosario Gil, Amparo Latorre, Juli Peretó, Francisco J Silva, and
Andrés Moya, "The
Frontier Between Cell and Organelle: Genome Analysis of Candidatus Carsonella
ruddii," BMC Evolutionary Biology VII (2007)
doi:10.1186/1471-2148-7-181). For a general discussion of
baterial signal transduction and minimal cognition, see Pamela Lyon, "The Cognitive Cell: Bacterial Behavior
Reconsidered,"
Frontiers in Microbiology VI (2015): 264. doi:
10.3389/fmicb.2015.00264.
[16] Some archaea can
swim faster than a cheetah can run, if speed is measured in body lengths per second. See Bastian Herzog and Reinhard Wirth, "Swimming Behavior of Selected Species of
Archaea," Applied and Environmental Microbioogy LXXVIII (March 2012): 1670-1674.
[17] See Fred Keijzer, Marc
van Duijn, and Pamela Lyon, "What Nervous Systems Do: Early Evolution,
Input–Output, and the Skin-Brain Thesis," Adaptive
Behavior XXI
(February 2013): 67–85, and Gaspar JŽkely, Fred Keijzer, and Peter Godfrey-Smith,
"An Option Space for Early Neural Evolution." Forthcoming in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B.
[18] See Christopher Moore and Rosa Cao, "The Hemo-Neural Hypothesis: On the Role of Blood
Flow in Information Processing," Journal
of Neurophysiology XCIX (May 2008): 2035-2047.
[19] For experimental work
on the sensitivity to history in neurons exposed to the same stimuli, see Jian-young Wu, Yang Tsau, Hans-Peter Hopp, Lawrence Cohen, Akaysha
Tang, and Chun Xiao Falk, "Consistency in Nervous Systems:
Trial-to-Trial and Animal-to-Animal Variations in the Responses to Repeated
Applications of a Sensory Stimulus in Aplysia." Journal of Neuroscience XIV (March 1994): 1366-1364, and
Asaf Gal, Danny Eytam, Avner Wallach, Maya Sandler, and Jackie Schiller, "Dynamics of Excitability over Extended
Timescales in Cultured Cortical Neurons," The Journal of Neuroscience XXX (December 2010):
16332–16342. For its relation to adaptive forms
of plasticity, see Ralph Greenspan, An
Introduction to Nervous Systems (Cold Spring
Harbor: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 2007), p.70.
[20] Ernst
Haeckel, "Our Monism: The Principles of a Consistent, Unitary
World-View," The Monist II
(July 1892): 481-486.
[21] See Nagel, ÒPanpsychismÓ in Mortal Questions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979), Galen Strawson, Consciousness and Its
Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? (Exeter: Imprint
Academic, 2006), Chalmers op. cit.,
Philip Goff, "The
Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem," forthcoming in Godehard Bruntrop and Ludwig Jaskolla
(eds.), Panpsychism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), and Giulio
Tononi, "Consciousness
as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto," Biological Bulletin CCXIV (December 2008): 216-242.
[22] See Herbert S. Jennings, Behavior of the Lower Organisms, (New York, Columbia University Press,
1904); Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Primacy of Movement (Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Press, 1999); Lynn Margulis, "The Conscious Cell," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences XCXXIX (April
2001): 55-70.
[23] The companion
paper cited in note 1 discusses this topic in more detail.
[24] For plants,
see Daniel Chalmowitz, What a Plant
Knows: A Field Guide to the Senses (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012). For sponges, see Sarah
Leys and Robert Meech, "Physiology of Coordination in Sponges"
Canadian Journal of Zoology LXXXIV (2) (2006): 288–306. For the historical sequence, see Kevin Peterson, James Cotton, James
Gehling, and Davide Pisani, "The Ediacaran Emergence of
Bilaterians: Congruence Between the Genetic and the
Geological Fossil Records,"Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society of London B
363 (January 2008): 1435–1443.
[25] JŽkely, Keijzer, and Godfrey-Smith
(op. cit).
[26] See Charles
Marshall, "Explaining
the Cambrian ÒExplosionÓ of Animals," Annual
Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences XXXIV (May 2006): 355–84, and Michael
Trestman, "The
Cambrian Explosion and the Origins of Embodied Cognition," Biological Theory VIII (July 2013): 80–92.
[27] See Stanislas
Dehaene, Consciousness
and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts (New York: Farar, Straus and Giroux,
2014) for a range of work bearing on what I call the
"latecomer" option, and also Milner and Goodale, Sight Unseen: An
Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
[28] Some scientific work
in this tradition is directed at the explanation of "consciousness,"
and may make a similar distinction between consciousness and subjective
experience that I make. Philosophers such as Jesse Prinz are explicit in
holding a broad view of consciousness which treats all subjective experience as
conscious; see Prinz, "A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness," in
Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins (eds.) Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For a defence of a
latecomer view of pain itself, see Brian Key, "Fish Do Not Feel Pain and its
Implications for Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness," Biology and Philosophy XXX (December
2015): 149-165. For
"workspace" views see Baars, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) and Dehaene op. cit.
[29] Influential
discussions include Hilary Putnam, "Psychological Predicates," in William Capitan and Daniel Merrill
(eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1967), pp. 37-48, and Jerry Fodor, Psychological
Explanation (New York: Random House).
[30] Some points made
here are indebted to William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale, "Multiple Realizability Revisited:
Linking Cognitive and Neural States," Philosophy of Science LXVI (June 1999): 175-207.
[31] For related
arguments about functional similarity and its relation to phenomenological
similarity, see Ned Block, "The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground," in Terry Horgan, Marcello Sabates and
David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes
from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Block sees these
considerations as pushing away from functionalism, towards a "neural"
approach to consciousness. My view in this paper is presented as a modification
of functionalism, but the positions may not differ much. It's possible to see
"functionalism" as tied inextricably to a claim of the sufficiency of
coarse-grained information-processing features for a full explanation of
mentality, a claim I reject.
[32] See John Searle,
"Minds, Brains, and Programs," Behavioral and Brain
Sciences III
(September 1980): 417- 424, and The
Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992).
[33] See Chalmers, "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing
Qualia," in Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. (Paderborn:
Ferdinand Schoningh, 1995), pp. 309-328. Chalmers
notes that his argument builds on earlier thought-experiments by Zenon Pylyshyn
and others; see
"The `Causal Power' of Machines," Behavioral and Brain Sciences III
(September 1980): 442-4.
[34] Chalmers op. cit. p. 324.